A comparative case of Slovenia, Romania, Serbia and Macedonia in the context of EU membership status
Martin Galevski and Georgiana Mihut
Abstract: Academic literature suggests the emergence of New Public Management (NPM) as a driver for managerial and governance trends in higher education (Gibbons et al., 1994). We use the governance equaliser framework developed by de Boer, Enders and Schimank (2007) to comparatively analyse and discuss the state of affairs of NPM in Slovenia, Romania, Serbia and Macedonia. Additionally, as the selected countries vary according to EU membership status, evidence suggesting the impact of the supranational institution on national higher education systems is discussed. Trends counterweighting to NPM ideals are presented for all selected countries, with the impact of EU membership status on the use of NPM in higher education governance being nonlinear and limited
1. Introduction
Nearly two decades ago, across European Union member states, there has been a considerable shift in the governing of public funded institutions, most significantly of higher education institutions (Neave & van Vught, 1991; Sporn, 2005). The rapid increase in the number, and size of universities and the complexity of demands placed upon them, have, many writers contend (Gibbons et al., 1994; Delanty, 2001; de Boer et al., 2007) promoted new ways in which higher education institutions are governed. This constellation of events has created space for New Public Management (hereinafter NPM) - to describe a wave of public sector reforms seeking to enhance the efficiency of institutions by the use of more managerial and market based approaches of governing (Hood, 1991; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000).
Similar to other types of public sector institutions, higher education has also been largely involved and affected by the NPM reform process. Some of the most influential representations of this normative model have increasingly advocated for a reorientation of the tradition of higher education, suggesting that the traditional (liberal) definition of universities – as institutions of self-contained activities – should be abandoned and replaced by a more provisional and pragmatic view towards the role of universities – as highly contextualised, more business-like and immensely dynamic education institutions (Gibbons et al., 1994). Yet, the necessity for change in the governing dynamics of universities towards the characteristics of the NPM have not been equally apparent among EU member states, still less between countries aspiring EU membership.
This paper, in the most general sense, explores the changes taking place under the NPM modality of governing, as one of the most influential models linked with recent higher education developments. More specifically, the paper examines the impact of NPM by comparing two EU member states (Slovenia and Romania) with two EU accession countries (Serbia and Macedonia). The analysis measures how far and in what respect there are differences or similarities between the EU and non-EU states under study as regards the attributes of the NPM paradigm. Given that countries under study have commonalities in the historical development of higher education, as well as somewhat similar effects of the economic and political transition, the study provides a fruitful ground for comparative research.
In order to comparatively analyse and discuss the state of affairs of NPM in Slovenia, Romania, Serbia and Macedonia, the main framework for analysis of this paper is the concept of “Governance Equaliser” as defined by de Boer, Enders and Schimank (2007). The equaliser has the purpose of measuring the impact of NPM elements at system level. The concept distinguishes between five independent governance dimensions that together create a governance framework of a particular higher education system: state regulation, stakeholder guidance, academic self-governance, managerial self-governance, and competition for scarce resource.
State regulation concerns the traditional top-down prescription of reform, whereby the state imposes and instructs in (lesser or greater) detail the intensity and direction of reform. Under stakeholder guidance the government remains an important actor, however, it does not have an exclusive decision-making power and as such frequently delegates public authority duties to “other actors, such as intermediary bodies or representatives of industry in university boards” (de Boer et al., 2007, p. 4). Academic self-governance concerns decision-making made by self-steering academic communities within the university. It tends towards strong collegial dominance of the professoriate in governing bodies. Managerial self-governance involves the formation of managerial leadership within universities. This spread of managerialism moves closer to a corporate model of governance with much tighter organisational structure and stronger influence of top level decision-making positions. Finally, competition stands for employing market-type competition principles within the higher education sector.
The authors of the equaliser also identify the suggested direction of reform, using NPM as a reference point. A perfect NPM model has a rather low level of state regulation and the role of academic self-governance should be marginal.
2. Applying the Governance Equaliser
2.1 Serbia
a) State Regulation and Stakeholder Guidance
The decade of the 1990s in Serbia was marked by a period of armed conflicts, political instabilities, devastating economic decline and international isolation. As other parts of the public sector, higher education was severely affected by the crises with most reform processes being suspended or under tight control from the authoritarian government – marking a lost decade for Serbian higher education. After the fall of the regime in 2000, the newly elected democratic government initiated a series of higher education reforms inspired by wider European trends. A major step in this direction was signing the Bologna Declaration in 2003 aimed to harmonise Serbian higher education towards the common European Higher Education space.
The new Law on Higher Education from 2005 served as the legal basis for restructuring the Serbian higher education landscape, with changes predominantly on system level and less on the institutional one (Branković, 2010). Referring to the higher education steering approaches, as defined by Gornitzka and Maassen (2000), and in close relation to the changes made to the legal framework, the Serbian higher education can be characterised as a hybrid model, incorporating aspects of both corporate steering and self-regulation. Traces of corporate steering are evident from the redistribution and transformation of authority on system level, with higher education moving away from the traditional emphasis on forms of state dominance towards a system of shared governance through buffer bodies (Vujačić et al., 2013). However, as most buffer bodies are mainly composed by members of the academic community, the distribution of decision-making authorities has now shifted predominantly in favor of the academic oligarchy rather than a wider pool of stakeholders. From this point of view, the Serbian higher education system falls close to the model of self-regulation, with the academic community setting the pace of reform. As pointed out by Turajlić (2009, p. 17) the transfer of power initiated by the state might be understood as a sign of “utmost confidence [in the academic community], but also of a complete disinterest bordering with neglect”.
b) Academic and Managerial Self-Governance
Decades long higher education governance tradition in Serbia is characterised by highly fragmented universities, representing a fairly weak conglomerate of highly autonomous units. Faculties thus tend to act as separate entities, representing virtually specialised ‘universities’ with little concerns over other units. With faculties having their own legal status, the role of the university has been reduced to administrative functions. The situation has created a misbalance between the authority of the dean as an executive position and the authority of the rector as an honorary position. While members of university leadership and administration incline to a more unified system of governance, the majority of academics and faculty managers have been reluctant to give up their administrative and financial autonomy and do not particularly welcome an organisational rearrangement in favor of a centrally administered and strategically run university (Zgaga et al., 2013).
Although the Law on Higher Education from 2005 did not change the basic university structure of autonomous faculties, it introduced an article which broadly provides a pathway towards the integration of universities: “…by implementing unified policies aimed at continuously improving the quality of teaching and improvement of scientific research” (LHE, 2005, Art. 48). The introduced article intended to follow the recommendations made by the European University Association earlier in 2002, which suggested that the move towards integration in line with the objectives of the Bologna process must come from “a top-down legislative decision, since there are too many vested interests in the current fragmented structures for this radical change to be possible as an initiative from within the university only” (EUA, 2002, p. 6). It is worth noting, however, that buffer bodies, such as the Commission for Accreditation and Quality Assessment and the National Council for Higher Education, along with some universities had a more important role in bringing about the functional integration of higher education institutions than the state itself, in the period following the legislative changes. Within the scope of the GOMES Tempus project designed to support the structural reform of higher education in Serbia, a model of functional integration of universities has been developed; with the intention of its acceptance at the national level in near future. The so-called “functional integration” laid down in the model is described as “a pre-requisite to improve the educational and scientific activities of the university, aimed at achieving the goals set by the strategy ‘Europe 2020’ and the relevant national strategy ‘Serbia 2020’ ” (GOMES, 2011, p. 1). While the model of institutional management proposed is in line with temporary requirements and trends in the EU, at this early stage of development it remains an open question whether it will gain traction to ensure a coordinated and substantive integration of universities in Serbia.
c) Competition
An important novelty introduced within the Law on Higher Education from 2005 is that the legislative act does not differentiate between public and private higher education institutions. However, public universities and private universities are in different positions in relation to funding, as private universities are not entitled to any public funding (EACEA, 2012). State funding for public universities is mainly allocated on the basis of line items, with predominantly input based criteria; leaving little space for funding allocation based on competition or performance or any output criteria (Ivošević & Miklavič, 2009).
In terms of the study programs being on offer, the majority of private universities compete with public universities in lucrative and low cost areas such as those of business studies, social sciences and humanities (Zgaga et al. 2013). Only few private universities have been able to diversify their portfolio in disciplines such as engineering, mathematics and other technical sciences (Vujačić et al., 2013).
2.2 Macedonia
a) State Regulation
After the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Macedonian Constitution from 1991 granted independent legal status to universities, however, a more specific piece of legislation regarding higher education was missing. In 2000, a Law on Higher Education was introduced and later replaced by a new version in 2008. In the wider lawmaking tradition of the country, both laws were detailed in their content and envisaged rigorous penalties for higher education institutions up to 100.000 euros. Among the majority of academics, however, the high intensity of legislative change and tendency to overregulate has been perceived as an attempt of institutional intrusion and potential loss of institutional autonomy. By means of extensive legislative regulation, the state has recently increased its power to set the most important elements of reform. With a commitment to rapidly improve the number of graduates, particularly in rural and less economically developed regions, the government established three more public universities and doubled the number of faculties in just five years (Galevski, 2013). As a result, in 2011 the number of newly enrolled students in tertiary education has risen by 43 per cent compared to the levels in 2006 (SSORM, 2011). As regards the funding, the Law amendments in 2003 and the later Law in 2008 handed funding responsibilities to the Council of Higher Education Funding, as an independent and intermediate body that operates on the principle of expertise and competence. However, until present, the body has not been formed, thus, the allocation of funds and the funding model remain the exclusive competences of the Ministry of Education; leaving little or no power to the universities for redistributing funds according to their particular needs. The present situation in Macedonia therefore falls close to the “sovereign state steering model” as defined by Maassen and Gornitzka (2000), where higher education is under tight control by political authorities and seen as a governmental instrument for reaching political, economical and social goals.
b) Stakeholder Guidance
In Macedonia, at present, the participation of various stakeholders, both on institutional and system level, is limited and only a small number of actors influence the decision-making processes. Strategic governing bodies such as University Senate and Rectors Board are consisted exclusively of traditional stakeholders, namely senior academics and students. After the signing of the Bologna Declaration in 2003, the level of student participation in governing bodies has increased overtime to a legally prescribed minimum threshold of 10 per cent. The Law on Higher Education from 2008 intended to introduce changes by establishing University Councils and Faculty Committees envisioned to incorporate external stakeholders from the business community, local government and other interest groups in the decision making processes. However, the practical competence of such bodies to represent the interest of various public groups within the university remains unclear and marginal. Periodic memorandum-based partnerships between the business community and individual faculties continue to be the predominant form of collaboration.
c) Academic and Managerial Self-Governance
In line with its previous socialist legacy, the Macedonian higher education system in the 1990s was characterised by a peer-driven model of collegial self-governance with the ‘academic oligarchy’ remaining the most important actor of internal governance. In addition, faculty units sustained a relatively high degree of independence, with little space for functional integration of universities. The internal organisational structure of public universities remained unchallenged for some time, despite a number of constraints being closely associated with the model in place. An evaluation carried out by the European University Association in 2003 identified the loose association of faculties as a major constraint and inadequate for modern universities (EUA, 2003a; 2003b). Following the changes of the Higher Education Law in 2008, public universities undertook an organisational and functional reform towards integration. The new Law took away the possibility of sub-units to act as legal entities and strengthened the role of centralised management (the University Senate, the Rector and the Rector’s Board). However, academic staff and student representatives remained as members of governing bodies. Bearing in mind the previous tradition of collegial self-governance, faculties maintained a considerable level of autonomy, particularly in areas related to curriculum and teaching (Vujačić et al, 2013b; EACEA, 2012).
d) Competition
Differently from some other countries in the Balkan region where competition among higher education providers has been developed mainly as a means of quality improvement and demand absorption in Macedonia competition came about as a secondary consequence of a politically driven discussion primarily focused on resolving the lack of higher education opportunities for ethnic minorities. In the 1990s the Albanian minority, which represented almost a quarter of the country’s population, was denied the right of higher education in the Albanian language, resulting with low number of ethnic Albanian students interested in furthering their education. In 2001, following the enactment of a new Law on Higher Education enabling the founding of private higher education providers, the South East European University (SEEU) was established as the first private university, aiming to respond to the educational needs of ethnic Albanians. Shortly after its launching, the functioning of SEEU created a situation where public universities faced the need to reform and improve. Low barriers to entry resulted in the increase of private universities, however, due to limited operational capacities, often these institutions have been perceived as unprepared for creating their own quality niche. The amendments to the Law on Higher Education from 2003 did create a legal basis for public financing of private higher education institutions. Due to scarce public financial resources, however, such a scheme has not been implemented in practice. In addition, with a series of measures initiated by the state - notably reduction of tuition fees within public universities and the launching of three new public universities – the relative competitive balance between private and public providers has been considerably disrupted – mostly in favor of the second; leaving the future of private higher education uncertain.
2.3 Romania
a) State Regulation
Along with the academic oligarchy, the state is still the most important player in governing the higher education landscape in Romania. The most important tool the state uses to steer higher education is issuing legislation. After the 1989 revolution, the total number of students enrolled in public higher education grew from 164.507 in 1989-1990 to 240.000 two years later. Sixty-six private universities emerged in the same period incorporating an addition of 100.000 students (Owen et al., 1995). At the same time, Romanian higher education seemed to lack a proper legal framework, and the state relied increasingly on ministerial orders and decrees. By 1995, when the first post-socialist Education Law was published, more than 2000 ministerial orders and decrees were issued (Owen et al., 1995). One would expect that such a high number of orders and decrees signal a low institutional autonomy, but Prof. Robert Reisz[i] characterises this period with a high level of autonomy for universities, as government officials enforced the regulations and the directives in a selective manner. This statement does not apply to private universities, as the Law for Accreditation of Higher Education Institutions, issued in 1993, created a number of minimum conditions for universities to receive accreditation and operate within the Law. This Law was targeted at regulating the massive number of private institutions that emerged in the early years after the revolution, some of which did not have sufficient operational resources (Bîrzea, 1996). With the enactment and enforcement of the 1995 Education Law, the autonomy of all universities in Romania starts to decrease again, as line item budgeting was used and only few autonomous buffer institutions mediate between universities and the state.
Since 1999, the autonomy of Romanian universities has increased, with the state implementing lump sum budgeting and formula based funding. The reforms in 2005 and 2006 introduced buffer institutions to mediate between the state and the tertiary education system, including “a two level quality assurance system” (CHEPS, 2007, p 185). The role of the state registered “some increase” in the decade before 2007, as it is involved to a large degree in designing the university mission and strategy, in steering its human resource management by creating general guidelines, enhancing the emergence of public-private partnerships, and determining the number of state subsidised student places (CHEPS, 2007, p. 185-186).
According to Oana Sârbu[ii], the Romanian accession to the EU in 2007 did not bring about substantial changes to the position of the state and university autonomy in Romania. A rush to implement Bologna reforms and increase the role of the students characterises the years before 2007. The reforms continued after accession, but few changes attributed to the EU can be noticed since.
In 2011 a new National Education Law is enacted, which envisages a number of important changes pertaining to the higher education field, including strict regulations on the election procedure and the term limit for rectors. The 2011 Law was a top down initiative of the government at the time, aiming at changing the long entrenched leadership of most of the large Romanian universities.
b) Stakeholder Guidance
Historically, official involvement of external higher education stakeholders has not been visible in Romania. Universities did not and do not have advisory bodies or boards of trustees that would be involved in the decision-making process of universities (Eurydice, 2008). The senate is formed solely from internal stakeholders of the university (Eurydice, 2008). The rector and the senate, as main decision making bodies within a university, become leading internal stakeholders.
Students gained more representation, not only at the university level, but also in the area of quality assurance. According to the 2011 National Education Law, 25 per cent of the university senate is comprised of student representatives (National Education Law, 2011, Art. 208). Two student representatives of the two student unions in Romania are members with voting rights in the Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher Education Council, the highest decision-making forum for quality assurance of higher education issues in Romania. Indirectly, quality assurance methodologies involve consultations of University stakeholders such as local and national companies and alumni (ARACIS, 2010).
c) Academic and Managerial Self-Governance
The concept of managerial self-governance has little or no significance in the Romanian context. The hierarchical structure of the Romanian university remained constant for the most part of its history. The most important decision-making bodies at the level of the university are the rector and the senate. Possible areas of tension might arise between different levels of governance within universities, specifically between the faculty level of governance and university level of governance, as Reisz indicates.
Middle management, in this case, faculties and departments, are involved to some degree in defining the mission and the strategy of a university, in designing new study programs, and in the arrangement of Public Private Partnerships. At the same time, they are involved to a large degree in the process of finance allocation, human resource management and student selection. All areas of involvement, with the exception of designing new study programs, coincide with areas of involvement of the central management (CHEPS, 2007). This overlap of responsibility could potentially lead to tensions between different hierarchical levels.
d) Competition
Competition for students is one of the main areas for rivalry between universities in Romania, as the main criteria for financial state allocations is the number of students (CNCFIS, 2007). Having in mind the decreasing number of students, partly influenced by the demographic loss of 17 per cent in Romania since 1992 (Cosciug, 2011), and along with the reduced success rate of national baccalaureate from 80 per cent in 2009 to 43 per cent in 2012 (Romania Libera, 2012), state universities struggle to attract students more than ever. In addition, the increase in the number of mobility programs in the EU context, as Sârbu points out, has resulted in a rise of the number of Romanian students choosing to study abroad.
The situation is even more difficult for private universities, the budget of which is based on collecting tuition fees. Reisz indicates the choice hierarchy of students faced with the decision of which university to attend: “the first choices are the public universities. Here, the more prestigious public universities have an advantage over the less prestigious ones (...). After state subsidised places are filled, there are not too many students left for private universities to compete for. This caused several of them to close down”.
Research funding represents another area of competition for universities, as research grants are allocated based on public calls for proposals. General funding schemes are based on set formulas, with both public and private universities that meet the excellence criteria being eligible to receive extra funds (UNEFISCDI, 2013). Other potential areas for competition, such as personnel and prestige seemed to be irrelevant in the perception of Reisz. What did seem to be relevant was the fact that universities in Romania started to compete in a global market, as more prestigious universities in Romania, such as the West University Timisoara and Babes-Bolyai University try to attract student from neighboring countries, such as Hungary and Germany.
2.4 Slovenia
a) State Regulation
According to article 58 of the Slovenian constitution, universities are autonomous. Early regulation of higher education attempts following the acquisition of national independence in 1991 address fundamental conceptual issues, such as the issue of the fragmented university system with strong faculties and a weak central administration, the quality and evaluation of institutions, and the Europeanisation and internationalisation of universities (Zgaga et al., 2013).
In 1993, the Higher Education Act (HEA) was adopted. The act started the abolishment of the legal status of faculties at the same time as allowing faculties to maintain ownership over financial accounts with “flows outside the public budget for higher education” (Zgaga & Miklavič, 2011, p. 16). Further amendments were introduced in 1999, when the concept of university autonomy was fully implemented and a lump sum budgeting scheme was introduced (CHEPS, 2006).
Slovenia joined the Bologna process in 1999. Both the Bologna process and the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) provided “a conceptual basis for modernisation” (Zgaga et al., 2012, p. 16) and steered the direction of state influence on higher education in relation to quality assurance.
In a personal communication, Pavel Zgaga[iii] describes a twofold status of the relation between the state and higher education. Firstly, the state creates a large space for autonomy for private higher education institutions. On the other hand, the political involvement in public higher education is very high, as changes in government are reflected in changes in policy. Issues of liberalisation of quality assurance criteria for private universities are at the heart of the debate between various political blocs in Slovenia. According to Ivan Laban[iv], the director of the Slovenian Quality Assurance Agency, the establishment of the agency as an autonomous agency in 2010 represents a signal for a diminishing role of the state in Slovenian higher education governance.
b) Stakeholder Guidance
The involvement of external stakeholders at a system level in Slovenian higher education is limited according to Zgaga. At an institutional level, students become prominent stakeholders in higher education in Slovenia. According to the HEA amendments of 1999, universities are required to create a governance structure composed by all faculty staff and at least one fifth of its members should be representatives of students (CHEPS, 2006). Similarly, students are involved in the process of electing the university rector.
c) Academic and Managerial Self-Governance
Traditionally, the academics have a high level of self-governing in Slovenia. The two most important governing bodies in a Slovenian university are the rector and the senate. Historically, due to legislation issued in late 60s, early 70s, faculties in Slovenia were provided with full legal personality. Universities were redefined as “associations of independent faculties” (Zgaga, 2011, p. 16-17). This heritage led to friction between the central level of university governance and the faculty level of governance that lasted past the HEA reforms in 1993 (Zgaga 2002, Zgaga, 2003). According to the personal communication given by Zgaga, managerial governance does not seem to be a relevant concept in the Slovenian context, as academic staff composes to the largest extend governing bodies.
d) Competition
Competition between private and public universities in Slovenia is virtually inexistent, as the private higher education institutions includes as little as 5 per cent of the total student population in the country (Ivošević and Miklavič, 2009).
Slovenian universities are financed through a lump sum budgeting scheme. The funding formula uses input and output criteria, along with field related factors and corrections based on the previous year budget. Slovenian universities have the autonomy to receive private funds from donors, rent and revenue of property, sponsorships, fees from service provisions, interest and the creation of commercial companies, but their ability to acquire loans is restricted by legislation (Eurydice, 2008). This budgeting scheme allows for a high level of financial autonomy (Ivošević & Miklavič, 2009). The lack of competition for general university funding incentivises universities in the public system to compete little with each other. Research funding, on the other hand, is distributed on a competitive basis. This area of funding brings some element of competition between universities.
As Zgaga indicates, partnerships for European funding acquisition determine universities to cooperate for economical reasons. International cooperation and mobility, under EU influence created an academic layer of competition between universities. As staff, teachers and students travel and as local universities become more international, new standards of excellence and quality are created.
3. Analysis and Conclusions
The country analyses above focusing on the elements of the government equaliser reveal the state and the academic oligarchy as the most important higher education actors in Macedonia, Serbia, Romania and Slovenia.
The role of the state varies discretely between the four countries, but regulations and finance quasi-monopolies make it a noteworthy player. May it be the national agencies for quality assurance, or independent funding bodies, buffer institutions in the selected countries decrease some of the state power over higher education.
Little external stakeholder involvement can be noticed in any of the analysed countries. The rector and the senate remain the most important internal stakeholders, and both this institutions are fully composed from representatives of the academia. As students gain increasing representation in higher education decision-making bodies, discussions about students as stakeholders become part of the academic jargon in Slovenia and Romania.
The concept of managerial governance has little manifestations in the nation states under scrutiny. It is the academic, collegial self-governance that describes the decision-making processes at an institutional level. Higher education systems in all analysed countries signal decision-making tensions between faculties, or middle level management, and the central administration. The reasons for this tension differ between Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia on one hand, and Romania, on the other. The ex-Yugoslav heritage allowed for faculties to have individual legal status, and act insularly from other faculties and the central management. While current legislation in Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia attempts at altering this heritage by removing the legal status of faculties, the cultural and behavioral ramifications can still be felt today. On the other hand, the reasons for tension between faculty and central management are due to overlapping areas of decision-making capacity in the Romanian context.
Areas of competition vary between the analysed countries, but the overall level of competition is rather low. This trend can be explained by the input based formula funding systems utilised. Competition between public and private universities has a low ramification mainly because of the quasi monopoly of the public universities over students in all countries. Research funding seems to be a common area of competition between universities. Recently, students became an area of competition for universities in Romania. Both in Romania and Slovenia, due to international mobility, universities perceive themselves as having to compete in the international arena, while competition in Macedonia and Serbia still pertains to the national borders.
Variations between the non-EU member states and the EU member states analysed are minimum. This serves as evidence of the reduced role of the EU in steering national higher education affairs. The Bologna process marked its fingerprint on all the analysed countries, but the EU functions mainly as a promoter of mobility, and a funding agency.
To conclude, our data suggests that concurrent trends to the ideal model of NPM can be found in our sample; the role of the state and academic governance, as opposed to the role of the market and managerial governance, appear to dominate the higher education landscape in the selected countries. Additionally, diverging from common believes on the leading role of the EU as a driver for NPM, we do not encounter evidence illustrating a significant discrepancy between the EU member states and the non-EU member states analysed in relation to the degree of prevalence of NPM in national higher education landscapes. This evidence suggests that alongside EU regulations, additional environmental and context dependent imperatives lead to usage of NPM in higher education governance.
Personal correspondence with:
[i] Robert Reisz is a Romanian scholar and researcher in the field of Higher Education, Policy Analysis and Social Statistics. Author of multiple writings in the area of Higher Education, he works for both the West University in Romania and Institut fur Hochschulforschung an der Martin Luther Universitat (HoF), Germany.
[ii] Oana Sârbu is the Chief Service of Experts and Specialty Inspectors in Accreditation and Quality Assurance working at the Romanian Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education.
[iii] Pavel ZGAGA is Professor of the Faculty of Education at the University of Ljubljana and is currently Director of the Centre for Education Policy Studies (CEPS).
[iv] Ivan Laban is the current Director of the Slovenian Quality Assurance Agency.
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